TLDR overview
- A cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM) is a machine-readable inventory of the cryptography a piece of software uses, and where it uses it: algorithms, protocols, certificates, and related key material.
- Quantum computers are expected to break RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. Governments have set deadlines for moving off them, and every migration plan starts with the same step: find out what you have.
- A CBOM earns its keep only when it is built from code, explainable down to the line, and current with every change, not when it sits in an exported file nobody reads.
- The open standard is CycloneDX (ECMA-424), so a CBOM sits alongside your SBOM.
- SonarQube already flags weak cryptography in code, and CBOM generation is coming to SonarQube, built from the same analysis that runs on every branch.
Pick a service your team shipped this year. Which algorithm signs its tokens? What key size? Which line of code made that choice, and who wrote it? Most teams can't answer without a week of digging. That was fine while cryptography just worked. It is about to stop being fine, because the algorithms protecting data today are now on a regulatory clock.
This page explains what a CBOM is, why cryptographic inventories have become a regulatory expectation, what a CBOM contains, how it differs from an SBOM, what makes an inventory useful, and how Sonar approaches cryptographic posture.
What is a cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM)?
A cryptographic bill of materials is a machine-readable inventory of the cryptography a piece of software uses, and where it uses it. It answers a question most teams cannot answer today: which algorithms, protocols, certificates, and key material does this application actually use, and on which line of code?
That record is the foundation for finding quantum-vulnerable algorithms, flagging ones that are already broken, and planning migration to post-quantum cryptography. Think of it as a cryptographic map of your software: instead of guessing which systems rely on RSA or SHA-1, you have an authoritative list tied to the code itself.
The main open standard is CycloneDX, the OWASP bill of materials standard that is also published as Ecma International standard ECMA-424. CBOM support arrived in CycloneDX 1.6, and version 1.7 added a shared registry of algorithm families and elliptic curves so different tools describe the same cryptography the same way. The OWASP Authoritative Guide to CBOM covers the full data model.
Why does a CBOM matter now?
The quantum clock is running faster than expected
In 2019, researchers estimated that breaking RSA-2048 would take about 20 million physical qubits running for about eight hours. In May 2025, Google's Craig Gidney cut that to fewer than one million qubits running for less than a week. In October 2026, Alice & Bob published an estimate of 22,593 physical qubits and about three days on its cat-qubit architecture, which assumes qubits that almost never suffer bit-flip errors.
These are estimates, not demonstrations. No quantum computer can do this today, and serious engineering problems remain. But the direction is hard to ignore. In the Global Risk Institute's Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2025, published in March 2026, 26 experts put the chance of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer within 10 years at 28% to 49%.
You don't need to pick a date for "Q-Day" to see the problem. You only need to compare two timelines: how long until the threat is real, and how long your migration will take.
Harvest now, decrypt later
The threat doesn't start when the first large quantum computer comes online. In a "harvest now, decrypt later" attack, an adversary records encrypted traffic today and stores it until it can be decrypted. NIST calls this one of the main reasons the transition is urgent.
If your systems handle data that must stay confidential into the 2030s (health records, financial data, intellectual property, government information), any of it sent today over quantum-vulnerable key exchange is already exposed. For that data, the deadline isn't 2030. It's the day it was sent.
What regulations require a cryptographic inventory?
Governments started putting dates on post-quantum migration in 2022. Most major economies have now set their own, and the US has pulled its most sensitive systems forward to 2030. Several frameworks name the inventory, and some name the CBOM itself, as the starting point.
Similar timelines exist in Canada, Japan, and many other countries, and ANSSI in France and BSI in Germany add baselines for organizations operating there. The details differ. The first step doesn't: discover and inventory first, then migrate. NIST's own announcement points beyond an organization's own systems to its "entire cryptographic supply chain."
What does a CBOM contain?
A CycloneDX CBOM records four kinds of cryptographic assets:
- Algorithms: such as AES-256-GCM, RSA-2048, SHA-1, or ML-KEM-768, with properties like mode, key size, and security level.
- Protocols: such as TLS versions and the cipher suites they allow.
- Certificates: such as the X.509 certificates that prove identity and carry public keys.
- Related cryptographic material: such as keys, initialization vectors, nonces, and salts. A CBOM describes what kind of material is used, not the secret values.
Each entry can also carry evidence: the file and line where the asset was found. Here is a simplified entry for RSA-2048 used for encryption:
{
"type": "cryptographic-asset",
"name": "RSA-2048",
"cryptoProperties": {
"assetType": "algorithm",
"algorithmProperties": {
"algorithmFamily": "RSA-PKCS1",
"primitive": "pke",
"parameterSetIdentifier": "2048",
"cryptoFunctions": ["encrypt"],
"classicalSecurityLevel": 112,
"nistQuantumSecurityLevel": 0
}
},
"evidence": {
"occurrences": [
{ "location": "src/main/java/com/acme/payments/TokenEncryptor.java", "line": 42 }
]
}
}A NIST quantum security level of 0 means the algorithm meets none of NIST's post-quantum security categories: a large enough quantum computer could break it. The evidence tells you exactly where to go to fix it.
How is a CBOM different from an SBOM?
If you already produce a software bill of materials (SBOM), you are halfway there. The two answer different questions, and both use CycloneDX, so they fit side by side.
An SBOM might tell you that an application ships Bouncy Castle. Only a CBOM tells you that it uses RSA-2048 for encryption on line 42 of the payments service. An organization preparing for post-quantum migration needs both, because a vulnerable algorithm and a vulnerable dependency are distinct problems with distinct fixes.
What does a CBOM let you do?
An inventory isn't the goal. It's what makes every next step possible.
- Find what's at risk. Separate quantum-vulnerable algorithms like RSA and elliptic curves from those that are already safe, and from those that are broken today, like MD5 and SHA-1.
- Decide what to fix first. Rank work by how long the protected data must stay secret, how sensitive it is, and which regulations apply.
- Hand developers a real task. "Replace RSA somewhere in this service" is a project. "Change the call on line 42" is a ticket.
- Show progress with evidence. A standard file that updates as code changes is something auditors and regulators can read. A spreadsheet isn't.
- Build crypto-agility. Once you know where cryptography lives, swapping algorithms becomes a planned change instead of an emergency.
A CBOM doesn't make you compliant on its own. It is evidence and a planning input. Compliance comes from the migration work it guides.
Why is finding your cryptography harder than it sounds?
If cryptography lived in one place, this would be easy. It's spread across thousands of files written over many years: your own code, the libraries you depend on, configuration files, and certificates loaded at runtime. The person who picked the cipher may have left years ago. And code is changing faster than ever now that AI coding agents write a growing share of it. Every new line can add a new place where cryptography is used.
Searching the repository for "RSA" won't find all of it. Look at this Java snippet:
String transform = config.get("token.cipher"); // "RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding"
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance(transform);
cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, publicKey);The algorithm name never appears next to the call that uses it. It's also weak in a way that has nothing to do with quantum computers: RSA with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding is a known risk today. A text search misses it. A developer survey misses it. A spreadsheet built last quarter is already out of date. It's not a skills problem. It's a visibility problem.
What makes a CBOM useful, and why do inventories fail?
Most inventories fail because they become static artifacts disconnected from the code they describe. A regulation requires one, a team generates it, and the exported JSON file is never opened again. The code keeps changing, and within a release or two the inventory describes a system that no longer exists. A point-in-time inventory also can't show progress from a baseline toward a target, so leadership has no way to answer "where are we, and are we on track?"
When you evaluate how to produce a CBOM, look for five things:
- Built from code, not surveys. The inventory should come from analyzing what the code actually does, including values that flow in from configuration.
- Consistent and repeatable. The same code should produce the same inventory every time, so changes in the CBOM reflect changes in the code.
- Explainable down to the line. Every entry should point to the file and line where it was found. If a developer can't find it, they can't fix it.
- Current with every change. Generate it in the pipeline, alongside the analysis that already runs on every branch, so it never goes stale between audits.
- In an open standard. Use CycloneDX so the CBOM works with your SBOM, your governance tools, and whatever comes next.
How can SonarQube help you build a cryptographic inventory?
Every line of code should be verified before it ships, whether a developer or an AI agent wrote it. Cryptography is part of that code.
SonarQube already flags weak cryptography in code, including weak hashing, insecure cipher modes and padding, short keys, and outdated TLS versions. With SonarQube Advanced Security, teams can also export an SBOM in CycloneDX or SPDX format to track the open source components they depend on.
The next step is knowing exactly which cryptography that code uses, and where. Sonar is bringing CBOM generation to SonarQube, built from the same analysis that already runs on every branch, so the inventory stays current as code changes.
Planned capabilities include:
- Discovery and inventory of algorithms, protocols, certificates, and key material at the project level, persisted server-side for tracking and exportable for audits.
- Assessment against framework baselines, including national guidelines such as ANSSI and BSI and strict targets such as US CNSA, with a portfolio view of compliant versus non-compliant cryptographic assets across repositories.
- Flags for obsolete algorithms such as 3DES, with step-by-step guidance toward quantum-resistant alternatives.
- Initial language coverage for Java, Kotlin, C#, Python, and PHP, with generic extraction planned for legacy environments.
Until then, don't wait for a mandate to land on your desk. The teams that finish this migration on time won't be the ones with the biggest budgets. They'll be the ones that knew where their cryptography was before the deadline arrived.
To get started, talk to Sonar about cryptographic inventory and quantum readiness.
